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As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems shift to interact with new domains and 
populations, so does AI ethics: a relatively nascent subdiscipline that frequently 
concerns itself with questions of “fairness” and “accountability.” This fairness-
centred approach has been criticized for (amongst other things) lacking the ability 
to address discursive, rather than distributional, injustices. In this paper I 
simultaneously validate these concerns, and work to correct the relative silence of 
both conventional and critical AI ethicists around disability, by exploring the 
narratives deployed by AI researchers in discussing and designing systems around 
autism. Demonstrating that these narratives frequently perpetuate a dangerously 
dehumanizing model of autistic people, I explore the material consequences this 
might have. More importantly, I highlight the ways in which discursive harms—
particularly discursive harms around dehumanization—are not simply 
inadequately handled by conventional AI ethics approaches, but actively invisible 
to them. I urge AI ethicists to critically and immediately begin grappling with the 
likely consequences of an approach to ethics which focuses on personhood and 
agency, in a world in which many populations are treated as having neither. I 
suggest that this issue requires a substantial revisiting of the underlying premises 
of AI ethics, and point to some possible directions in which researchers and 
practitioners might look for inspiration. 
 





Conventional approaches to AI ethics frequently concern themselves with 
notions of “fairness,” “accountability,” and “transparency”—notions which 
have been troubled repeatedly by scholars as failing to attend to (amongst 
other issues) the discursive consequences of AI systems and 
development (Hoffmann, 2019). Further, AI ethics investigations of these 
principles—particularly fairness—are frequently silent on questions of 
disability, and the lives of disabled people, usually attending to questions 
of race and gender in isolation. Beginning from Elizabeth Ellcessor’s 
argument that adopting a disabilities studies framework allows us to “find 
new questions” (Ellcessor, 2016, p. 4), I seek to demonstrate not only the 
harms to disabled people that occur when ethical frameworks fail to 
explicitly consider us, but ways in which incorporating disability into our 
evaluations of AI systems reveals more general and fundamental 
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In order to demonstrate this, I use this paper to inquire into the discursive 
frameworks perpetuated by AI developers’ work, and the consequences of 
these frameworks, in the case of AI research around autism. Depending 
on who one asks, autism can be conceptualised in many different ways. 
Under a “medical” model of disability, which treats diagnostic criterion as 
representing the core truths of autistic minds and lives, autistic people 
(autists) are individuals suffering from a disorder, one characterized by 
stunted or absent social skills and emotional awareness. In contrast, 
figures aligned with the “neurodiversity” movement seek to portray autism 
and autists in a more positive light (Dyck & Russell, 2020). Floating 
between these two points are an array of other perspectives that seek to 
contextualise and historicise the construction of “autism” as a concept and 
the already-political nature of diagnostic procedures (Eyal, 2010; Timimi et 
al, 2019), trace the (often racialized and gendered) variations in autistic 
experiences of the world (Brown, Ashkenazy & Onaiwu, 2017), and 
articulate and critique the violence that both positive and negative 
stereotypes of autistic lives and minds produce (McGuire, 2016). 
 
Discourses surrounding autism are a particularly apt site of inquiry into AI 
ethics’ consideration of disability, for two reasons. First; a large body of 
work has demonstrated the particular power and relevance of popular 
conceptions of autism to autistic lives. Narratives of autism—largely 
authored by non-autistic family members, academics and other self-
appointed experts—play an outsize role in defining the shape of autism as 
a concept, and the conventional approach that society takes in evaluating, 
interpreting and governing autistic lives and futures; as Ann McGuire 
writes, drawing on Ian Hacking, “contemporary stories of autism 
are…functioning to constitute what autism is and can be” (McGuire, 2016, 
p.11). 
 
Second; these narratives—drawing on the medical model, and 
consequently the idea of autists as asocial and overly rational—resonate 
strongly with ideas of algorithms, automation and machinery. As 
demonstrated by Jordynn Jack, M. Remi Yergeau and other rhetoricians, 
there is a longstanding symbolic link between autists and machines. This 
not only takes the form of representations of autists as “computer 
geeks”—of, as Maji Nadesan puts it, “the idea that people with autism are 
technologically gifted and are particularly adept with computer technology” 
(Nadesan, 2013, p. 4)—but through representing autists as computers; as 
robotic, machine-like “others” (Waltz, 2008). Indeed, even academic 
scholarship and popular media inquiries into technology frequently deploy 
these popular frames of autism as a way of conceptualizing technical 
systems; Pinchevski and Peters describe purported “elective affinities 
between autism and new media” (Pinchevski & Peters, 2015), while a 
recent Forbes editorial is bold enough to parallel autistic people and self-
driving cars (Razdan, 2020). 
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My inquiry focuses on discourses of autism in two AI spaces; researchers 
working on algorithms to automatically identify and diagnose autism, and 
the company Daivergent, which employs autistic people in labelling 
machine learning data. Through a critical analysis of papers, press 
releases and media coverage, I conclude that in both cases autists are 
portrayed as asocial, fundamentally lacking in the ability to know and 
understand, and consequently, lacking in agency and personhood. 
 
Perpetuating and reinforcing these discourses has profound material 
consequences for autistic people inside and outside the spaces impacted 
by these technologies and the organisations developing and deploying 
them. More widely, however, the examination of disability and 
disempowerment highlights limitations in conventional AI ethics—
limitations which go far further than “fairness” and include transparency, 
accountability and other principles which demand harmed populations be 
in communication with developers, even as AI systems and researchers 
actively undermine the legitimacy of some communicators. This calls not 
just for an avoidance of discourses which treat autistic people as inhuman, 
but a wider revisitation of the premise of communication and capacity that 





Conventional views of AI ethics 
With the increasing development and deployment of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), attention has turned to the question of “AI ethics:” the articulation of 
various approaches to the appropriate and “good” use of AI. It is important 
to avoid treating this as entirely novel: within the field of surveillance 
studies, for example, scholars have been investigating the rise of 
automated, algorithmic decision-making for decades (Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 
1994; Norris & Armstrong, 1999). But the urgency of it—the widespread 
feeling that AI is “a significant emerging and future-shaping technological 
field that is developing at an accelerating rate” (Goode, 2018), and a 
corresponding rise in public, governmental, scholarly and corporate 
interest—has led to a particular flourishing of both applied and theoretical 
scholarship. The result has been myriad sets of principles, guidelines and 
policies around “good” AI, what it constitutes, and what is necessary to 
produce it (Whittlestone et al., 2019; Jobin et al., 2019). 
 
As would be expected, the rapidly expanding nature of the field and the 
wide range of stakeholders means that these principles are yet to 
“stabilize:” theorists and practitioners frequently disagree over precisely 
what constitutes an ethical approach. But some components appear fairly 
consistently and frequently—in particular, notions of fairness, 
3
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accountability, and transparency (Stark & Hoffmann, 2019; Hagendorff, 
2019; Floridi et al., 2018). Although each of these principles have been 
conceptualized and articulated in many different ways, (van Nuenen et al, 
2020; Wieringa, 2020), a broad-strokes summary would be that fairness 
requires an avoidance of discrimination in making algorithmic decisions, 
transparency the disclosure of the rationale behind any such decision, and 
accountability a mechanism of addressing any harmful consequences or 
algorithmic failures. 
 
Fairness has been a particularly frequent topic of discussion. Approaching 
fairness as a technical problem—does a system produce uneven 
outcomes for different demographic groups?—both academic and industry 
researchers have begun focusing on technical tools to identify and correct 
discriminatory systems, seeking to fix one algorithm with another (Bellamy 
et al., 2019; Spiecher et al., 2018). Interdisciplinary researchers have 
similarly attended to fairness, treating questions of bias as a primary 
component of an algorithmic system’s moral valence (Buolamwini & 
Gebru, 2018; Chouldechova, 2017). 
 
AI meets Disability 
Although there is value in much of this scholarship, there are two gaps in it 
that are—for my work—particularly relevant. The first is in how fairness 
specifically (and ethical duties in general) are discussed; while gender and 
race are frequently deployed as protected characteristics to be scrutinized 
in evaluating algorithmic systems, disability is not. Instead, it is often left 
(at best) unmarked. Although a small number of works that substantively 
discuss the ways that algorithmic systems could discriminate against 
disabled people, a 2019 review of 1,659 AI ethics article abstracts found 
eleven containing disability-related keywords (Lillywhite & Wolbring, 
2019). This is particularly concerning given the increasing interest in 
explicitly applying algorithmic systems to questions of disability. 
 
There are signs this is beginning to change. A call by Meredith Ringel 
Morris on “AI and Accessibility” (Morris, 2019), in parallel with a dedicated 
workshop at the ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and 
Accessibility (ASSETS) 2019 (Trewin, 2018), provided a rare centring of 
disability in discussions of AI ethics. Taken in concert with the World 
Institute on Disability’s statement on AI (World Institute on Disability, 
2019), and a report by AI Now directly addressing disability as a vital area 
of consideration (Whittaker et al., 2019), we can see an increasing (and 
much-needed) attentiveness to disability from AI ethicists. As would be 
expected, given the already-discussed trend towards fairness as a general 
value in AI ethics, this attentiveness frequently centres notions of bias and 
discrimination as their core concern. The ASSETS workshop, for example, 
was specifically titled “AI Fairness for People with Disabilities;” the World 
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Institute on Disability’s statement repeatedly evoked questions of dataset 
bias and disproportionate outcomes as their primary concern. 
 
The problem, however, is that this framing of ethics is anything but 
uncontested, as suggested by a paper at that workshop specifically 
contesting it (Bennett & Keyes, 2019). There are frequent critiques raised 
about fairness as a sole or primary ethical value for artificial intelligence, 
both generous and pointed. Some researchers are concerned by the 
immediacy of fairness: the way that fairness-based approaches to ethics 
typically evaluate the immediate outputs of an algorithm, while leaving the 
longer-term consequences unexamined (Selbst et al., 2019). Others point 
to the manifold definitions of fairness, and the vastly different material 
outcomes produced by each one (Hutchinson & Mitchell, 2019). Less 
optimistically, some critics highlight the treatment of “fairness” as a value 
that can, at least theoretically, be modelled, as anything but an accident. 
Instead they contend that the focus on computable ethical principles that 
do not address more structural and longitudinal outcomes is precisely the 
point, constituting “ethics-washing” that allows organisations to continue 
with “business as usual” (Wagner, 2018; Sloane, 2019). 
 
Discrimination and Discourse 
One particular issue—the second of the two gaps mentioned above—is 
the question of discursive, rather than directly material harms. As 
Hoffmann notes in her work on “Where Fairness Fails” (Hoffmann, 2019), 
a fairness-oriented frame, with its focus on materiality, “fails to 
appropriately attend to the legitimising, discursive or dignitary dimensions 
of data...algorithms do not merely shape distributive outcomes, but they 
are also intimately bound up in the production of particular kinds of 
meaning, reinforcing certain discursive frames over others” (Hoffmann, 
2019, p.908). In other words, what algorithms do is not just a question of 
material goods and (direct) material harms, but a question of the 
discourses and narratives they depend on, perpetuate and legitimise. A 
large body of work has looked at the discourses surrounding artificial 
intelligence and AI ethics; Hoffmann’s paper, along with the work of Peña 
Gangadharan & Niklas, Dencik et al. and several others (Peña 
Gangadharan & Niklas, 2019; Dencik et al., 2018) asks us to look at the 
consequences of those discourses. 
 
By “discourse,” critical scholarship does not mean something as simple as 
statements, or rhetoric: rather, it means how statements fit into 
knowledge; how they shape and signify what can be known, through what 
methods, and through what actors (McHoul & Grace, 2015). To illustrate, 
we can examine Bivens & Hoque’s “Programming sex, gender and 
sexuality” (Bivens & Hoque, 2018), which Hoffmann highlights as an 
example of critical discourse analyses in technological domains. Bivens & 
Hoque investigate the discourses deployed in and around “Bumble,” a 
5
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dating app billed as embodying feminist values. Exploring public relations 
statements by the company that designs it and its figureheads, media 
coverage and aspects of the app’s design, the researchers articulate how 
the “feminist” figure the app is designed for is specifically a middle-class, 
white, cisgender and heterosexual woman, with sometimes-dangerous 
consequences (including the possibility of assault) for those who fall 
outside that mold. 
 
Bivens & Hoque’s point is not just that the app is exclusionary to a vast 
range of people, but that this exclusion generates meaning: within the 
world of Bumble, to be feminist is to be a white, cisgender and 
heterosexual woman; to be male is to be a threat; to be a lesbian is to be 
non-existent. These frames, and the way that they resonate with wider 
cultural narratives, delegitimises particular populations. Bumble is not 
simply an app but a tool for meaning-making and knowledge generation—
one that cannot, as designed, be positively applied to those outside a 
narrow norm. 
 
Similarly, both the technologies and cultural imaginaries entangled with 
“AI” serve as a source of meaning and knowledge. As a consequence, we 
should attend not just to whether particular populations are excluded, or 
not, but the terms under which that happens: the justifications used, the 
framings they are subject to, and how this might reinforce or undermine 
damaging cultural frames regardless of what “the software” is intended to 
do. If applications of AI ethics to disability do not (or cannot) investigate 
this, then the model of ethics we are using may allow vast harms to go 
unnoticed by those with the structural power to address them. Autism is a 
particularly pertinent case study given that—as discussed earlier—it is 
strongly subject to and shaped by cultural narratives and assumptions. AI 
interventions around it, and any ethical silence on discursive harms, thus 
involve pressing on an already-skewed scale. 
 
 
AI Interventions in Autism 
 
To demonstrate the importance of inquiring into discursive framings within 
AI, and the harm such framings can cause, I undertake a critical discourse 
analysis of AI research publications and popular coverage that concern 
themselves with autism as a phenomenon, and autistic lives as a site of 
utility or intervention. This analysis concerns itself with how “dominant 
discourses (indirectly) influence…socially shared knowledge, attitudes and 
ideologies…[and] facilitate the formation of specific social representations” 
(van Dijk, 1993, pp. 258–9). In the case of autism, I centre questions of 
what social representations of autism (and autists) are (re)produced in the 
corpus, and whose voices are included or excluded from the process of 
shaping those representations. Such an approach has been undertaken in 
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other research on disability and technology, including Julie Elman’s work 
on wearable technologies (Elman, 2018) and Spiel et al.’s inquiries into 
the experiences of autistic children using co-designed technologies (Spiel 
et al., 2017). 
 
Sites of Analysis 
The analysis focuses on two different projects—more accurately, one 
project, and one research subfield—both of which concern themselves 
with autism as a phenomenon, and autistic lives as a site of utility or 
intervention. My particular sites of inquiry—sites where autism and AI take 
form together—are (respectively) Artificial Intelligence for Autism 
Diagnosis (or AIAD) and Daivergent. 
 
AI for Autism Diagnostics (AIAD) originates in the perception that current 
autism diagnostics are “expensive, subjective and time-consuming” (Jiang 
& Zao, 2017). By replacing existing mechanisms (which are centered on 
conversations between doctors and patients, and/or their friends and 
family), researchers hope to provide “efficient objective measures that can 
help in diagnosing this disease [sic] as early as possible with less 
effort” (Thapaliya et al., 2018). 
 
Such replacements come in a range of different forms. Many papers use 
computer vision—machine learning systems that “see”—but this is 
sometimes to examine behavioural or social responses (Hashemi et al., 
2018), sometimes to specifically evaluate eyeball movement (Jiang & Zao, 
2017), or similarly, gait (Hasan et al., 2018), head movement (Bovery et 
al., 2019), or general upper-body form (Wedyan & Al-Jumaily, 2016). 
Outside of computer vision-based approaches, researchers have also 
looked at the analysis of conversational or voice recordings for auditory 
cues (Santos et al., 2013), the administration of screeners through a 
mobile app (featuring a predictive model that interprets the data) (Omar et 
al., 2019), or tracking the participant’s attempts to assess emotions while 
observing videos (Uluyagmur-Ozturk et al., 2016). Many of the 
methodological approaches also involve a robotic component, with robots 
serving as the “unbiased” administrators or recorders of audio, video or 
written tests (Prescan et al., 2018; Petric et al., 2017). 
 
To analyse work in AIAD, I constructed a corpus of 82 papers that 
investigated the use of machine learning systems for autism diagnosis. 
Drawing influence from Waidzunas & Epstein’s investigation of the history 
of the plethysmograph (Waidzunas & Epstein, 2015), I followed the 
citation networks of papers that featured the terms (“autism” OR “autistic”) 
AND “machine learning,” incorporating into the corpus any papers that 
both cited a work in the initial “seed” dataset, and concerned themselves 
with autism diagnostic or screening tools. In and of themselves, these are 
narrow keywords; one might ask whether incorporating (for example) 
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“artificial intelligence,” “neural network” or more precise machine learning 
terminology would produce different results for the initial seed papers. The 
answer is undoubtedly yes, but the reliance on citational networks rather 
than keywords alone goes some way towards mitigating this limitation. 
The resulting corpus is, while not comprehensive, fairly cohesive, with 
papers regularly citing not simply one other work within the corpus but 
many. 
 
Daivergent (the name of which plays on AI and the idea of autistic people 
as deviant or other) originates with a very different perceived problem: the 
question of autistic people’s unemployment. The company was founded 
by two data scientists, Bryon Dai and Rahul Mahida, both of whom have 
autistic relatives—a brother and a cousin, respectively—and funded by the 
venture capitalist Brian Jacobs, whose son is autistic (Galer, 2019; Levy, 
2019). Concerned about their relatives’ future after child-oriented disability 
services stopped being applicable, Dai and Mahida began Daivergent in 
2017 to provide a bridge between autistic people and the technology 
industry.1 
 
This bridge consists of, in parallel, offering autistic people jobs in 
classifying and “hand-coding” the input data for AI, and training in 
workplace norms and practices. To the founders, pairing autistic people 
with hand-coding takes advantage of what they see as the nature of 
autism: a “unique aptitude” for “intensively focused, complex, repetitive 
processes” (Galer, 2019). While most people get bored of such work, 
autists are seen as individuals who “can do it for the day, can do it for the 
week, can do it month after month” (Kadet, 2019). In exchange, they 
receive salaries of $15-20 an hour, and the opportunity to “gain a 
meaningful life” (Kung, 2019), with the founders pointing to ex-employees 
who have gone on to work as a clerk, in a payroll role, or “even in other 
places such as game design” (Galer, 2019). 
 
Daivergent is hardly the only company seeking to market itself as 
rendering autists “productive” in the technology sector—other examples 
include Auticon, which describes itself as “[providing] a neurodiverse and 
agile workforce to improve our client’s IT projects” (Auticon, 2020), and 
Aspiritech, “a world-class QA testing company that empowers individuals 
on the autism spectrum to fulfill their potential through meaningful 
employment combined with social opportunity” (Aspiritech, 2020). But 
Daivergent is (so far as I can determine) singular in positioning autists as 
a specialised workforce within Artificial Intelligence; as unique assets in 
developing AI systems and the datasets they depend on. Interestingly, 
and in juxtaposition with (or perhaps reflecting?) the needs around 
 
1 The issue of the employment and segmentation of disabled people has been widely 
problematized and historicised; see (for example) Parker, Owen & Gould, 2012; Friedner, 
2015; and Simon, 1994 
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automated diagnostic systems, Daivergent’s registration process does not 
require medical documentation—although they are silent on their 
expectations, it seems likely that self-diagnosed autists make up some 
percentage of their users. 
 
Corpus contributions pertaining to Daivergent consisted of all media and 
marketing coverage of the company—both traditional venues (such as 
The Wall Street Journal) and non-traditional (the marketing blog of 
Amazon, whose software Daivergent uses)—that could be discovered 
through LexisNexis, along with the contents of Daivergent’s website and 
marketing materials. This corpus spanned approximately two years, from 
the founding of the company in December 2017 until December 2019.  
 
On the surface, these are very different: academic researchers versus a 
private company, AI usage versus AI design, attempts to label autism 
versus attempts to label with autism. But that is precisely the point: they 
are highly distinct environments, meaning that the strong alignment 
between the narrative representations of autism they deploy demonstrates 
that these representations are likely to appear far more frequently in AI 
than in these two cases alone. Similarly, while there are obvious 
differences in the types of source documents (publications versus news 
coverage), both constitute the most available material in which the actors 
represent themselves to their community and to the wider world. While 
they have different audiences, they are ultimately the same kinds of 
audience within the worlds that AI researchers and startup founders, 
respectively, occupy. 
 
Analysing Discourses of Autism 
After obtaining the source texts, I analysed and coded them following an 
approach based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which (as 
discussed above) focuses on the replication of dominant discursive 
frames, and the ways in which those frames constrain individuals and 
communities subject to them. In this case, my approach is one of 
“sociodiagnostic critique:” I seek not simply to analyse the texts for internal 
contradictions, but to situate them in the context of wider discourses and 
society, and my own background knowledge (Reisgl & Wodak, 2005). 
 
To a certain degree, CDA is methodologically agnostic; there are few 
consistent approaches in how data should be collected and analysed 
(Meyer, 2001). My approach consisted of collecting the source texts, and 
then generating a set of themes through an inductive coding of the texts—
looking particularly at how these texts described or discussed autistic 
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This approach generated a range of common themes. This included (1) 
framings of autism in a highly medicalized fashion—as something 
embodied, and something wrong, worth addressing and correcting—(2) 
framings of autism as an epidemic, and a concern of particular urgency, 
(3) positioning both AIAD and Daivergent as attempts to intervene in and 
normalise autistic existences (4) a strong neoliberal motivation behind 
those interventions, with the importance of addressing autism framed in 
terms of financial productivity, and (5) a general lack of explicit inquiry into 
race and gender, accompanied by implicit framings of autism as a 
fundamentally white and male phenomenon. 
 
Each of these themes are important and deserving of investigation. 
Investigating all of them in a single paper, however, would produce rather 
shallow analyses. I highlight them here largely for methodological 
transparency, and to surface them as areas of future research for other 
scholarly works (and/or scholars). Instead, I would like to focus in depth on 
one particular theme that arose—the theme of autistic communication, 
and of knowledge. How do AIAD and Daivergent materials construct the 
ability of autists to know, and to communicate that knowledge? 
 
 
Autism Discourses in AI 
 
The terms “to communicate” or “to know” have a range of possible 
meanings and interactions. My understanding and use of those terms in 
this paper draw from feminist philosophers of knowledge, specifically the 
work of feminist epistemologists who (from the 1970s onwards) have 
consistently attended to questions of knowledge and communication. This 
consists not just of examining what constitutes knowledge, but “attention 
to what kind of subject one must be in order to be (seen as) a knowing 
subject” (Tuana, 2017, p. 126); attending to who can know. Under this 
frame (and many other approaches to questions of knowledge),2 
knowledge and communication are deeply bound up in each other. 
Knowledge must be communicated, recognised, and treated as credible in 
how it is evaluated (McConkey, 2004). 
 
The social and reciprocal nature of knowledge and its construction is well-
established in Science and Technology Studies; as Helen Longino 
summarises, “scientific inquiry is a collaborative human activity [and is] 
socially organized in certain ways that affect both goals and criteria of 
success” (Longino, 1990, p. 17). This is neatly demonstrated in the work 
of historian Ann Johnson, whose explorations of the social circumstances 
of engineering design processes treat technology as the result of socially-
 
2 Wittgenstein, for example, noted that “knowledge is in the end based on 
acknowledgement” (Wittgenstein, 1969), and it is difficult to place him within feminist 
epistemology due to (amongst other things) his renowned misogyny. 
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mediated knowledge, and (in some respects) as an instantiation of such 
knowledge (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2009). But this relationship between 
knowledge and social recognition is not just a matter of professionalized 
research, or an abstract, theoretical concern; knowledge-making is deeply 
important to day-to-day activities and individuals’ status in society. As 
Genevive Lloyd notes in her foundational work on feminist epistemology, 
in a society that conceives of itself around notions of rationality, the ability 
to know (and be seen to know) is deeply tied up with one’s 
humanity (Lloyd, 2002). Put simply, someone who is not a recognisable 
knower is not a person, and vice versa. Both the ability to communicate 
and the ability to know thus have deep implications for personhood 
(Congdon, 2018). 
 
Scholarship on epistemic personhood has frequently identified disability a 
factor in its extension—so, too, race and gender. Given this, and the long 
history of how race, gender and disability are interwoven in both discursive 
and material structures of oppression (Samuels, 2014), my analysis aims 
to consider not only the positioning of autists writ large but the role that 
gender and race play in the narratives of autism on display, and the 
consequences of those narratives. 
 
Communication and Knowledge of Others 
Questions of sociality are deeply implicated in both societal framings of 
autism, and framings of knowledge—and so it is no surprise to see it 
appear in the ideas of autism deployed by AI researchers and developers.  
 
By sociality I mean the ability to appropriately and properly interact with 
others—something that has implications around both communication and 
knowledge. An absence of sociality is “often deemed to be a major feature 
of those diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum” (Milton, 2012): it is a 
core component of narratives within research (Verhoeff, 2012), current 
and defunct diagnostic criteria (O’Reilly et al., 2019), and public 
perception (Billawala & Wolbring, 2014). When it comes to 
communication, autists are sometimes framed as literally lacking the 
ability to communicate with others—many of us are nonverbal. For those 
of us who are verbal, our particular tropes are treated as inappropriate or 
invalid. These include echolalia (repeating the words of another), which is 
seen as containing no value (Roberts, 1989), and overly direct styles of 
communication, frequently treated as rude or disruptive. Verbal and non-
verbal autists often engage in stimming—repetitive motions to ground 
one’s sensory presence in an environment—which is often seen as 
disruptive to the status quo and a deviation from appropriate 
communication (Nolan & McBride, 2015). 
 
There are alternative interpretations of each of these: stimming as a 
coping mechanism (Kapp et al., 2019), sociality as being constitutable in 
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autistic ways (Heasman & Gillespie, 2019), echolalia as a form of 
communication (de Jaegher, 2013)—but that is not the point. Autistic 
modes of communication are treated as less-valid, and less intelligible. 
Moreover, the explanation for unconventional communication is often one 
of knowledge: rather than simply being ignorant, autistic people are seen 
as not being able to understand what is appropriate communication, and 
incapable of understanding others. 
 
In both AIAD literature and the materials released to frame Daivergent, we 
see the same stereotypes and tropes replicated. Both diagnostic AI 
researchers and Daivergent figureheads are unified in pointing to 
abnormal social behaviour and communication as an autistic attribute: 
“serious shortcomings in their social skills” (Irani et al., 2018). More 
specifically, “deficiency” in making eye contact (Uluyagmur-Ozturk et al., 
2016), “serious problems with being creative” (Lund, 2009), “difficulties” in 
recognising the emotions of others, and “delay or perversion in 
language” (Altay & Ulas, 2018). It “makes ordinary social interactions 
particularly challenging” (Levy, 2019), explaining the high unemployment 
rate: as one set of researchers mournfully inform us, “about 50% of people 
with autism can never ... make useful speech” (Altay & Ulas, 2019). 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, the interventions themselves build on and replicate 
these assumptions. In the case of AIAD, one way of framing the computer 
vision-oriented diagnostic tools—intended to replace, again, subjective 
interviewing—is to understand it as dependent on the presumption that 
diagnosis cannot rely on purposeful autistic communication. In the case of 
Daivergent, we see a repeated emphasis on the fact that the company 
provides not only jobs, but social skills opportunities: it emphasizes that 
“Daivergent stands out for the training it provides…not just technical skills 
but social and communication skills-training” (Prafder, 2019), and offers 
employees the ability to “Join any of our 15 shared interest groups to meet 
like-minded individuals that share your passions” (Daivergent, 2019a). 
Positioning itself as a provider of “unique social and communication 
training opportunities...alongside shared interest groups that help connect 
the autism community to one another,” Daivergent operates from the 
implicit assumption that autistic community—of which there is much, 
including organisations serving/led by non-verbal autistic people (Yergeau, 
2018)—does not exist; that autistic communication must be guided and 
shaped to be legitimate or capable of being recognised and 
understood (Daivergent, 2019b; Demo, 2017). 
 
Knowledge of Self 
So if autism is defined by a lack of communicative competence, and a lack 
of understanding others—where does that come from, and what are the 
implications? The dominant explanation within popular and academic 
ideas of autism is Baron-Cohen’s model of “Theory of Mind:” the idea that 
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autistic people simply lack empathy and an understanding of 
others (Dinishak, 2016).3 From this comes the associations autism has 
with a lack of empathy, bluntness, and difficulties communicating. 
 
But there are other implications that stem from this as well; implications 
about autistic knowledge of self. “Empathy,” in much theory and 
philosophy, is not something that just appears de novo: it is something 
learned, and premised on our own experiences. The analogy of a 
“simulation” is used; we model our idea of others on our own senses of 
self, and simulate how we would interpret the situation were we in “their 
shoes.” A consequence of this is that normative theories of autistic minds 
do not just imply a lack of understanding of others, but that this stems from 
a lack of understanding of self. Jeanette Kennett, for example, uses “the 
highest-functioning autistic people” as an intellectual foil, positioning them 
as “[having) some capacity for introspection about their condition” 
(emphasis mine) and thus implying that the default state for autists is total 
ignorance of self (Kennett, 2002). Autists are framed as unreliable 
narrators of their internal state, incapable of knowing and representing 
their needs or desires, much less communicating them. Indeed, as noted 
by M. Remi Yergeau,4 “clinical constructions of autism frequently position 
expertise and self-knowledge as antithetical to autism itself” (Yergeau, 
2018, p.140). 
 
In the absence of such knowledge, autistic people cannot be credible 
sources of information—not even information about ourselves. With 
Daivergent, it is notable that (with one exception, discussed later) no 
autistic people speak in their materials, press coverage, interviews or 
marketing reports. Instead, the idea of autism and the needs of autists are 
communicated by non-autistic people, pointing to the existence of autistic 
family members as a source of their expertise. Dai, for example, is 
depicted as having “first-hand experience with the challenge” by dint of 
having a brother who directly experiences autism (Galer, 2019), while 
Mahida states that “We both [have) family members with autism. We know 
the type of things they enjoy doing,” generalising those “things” to autists 
as a whole, and speaking for autists as a population when he states 
emphatically that “They want to work in tech. They want to work doing 
things for AI” (Kung, 2019). 
 
Within the diagnostic AI research, the bulk of users and perspectives 
center familial voices rather than autistic ones. In Thabtah’s study, the app 
was designed for use by “a variety of stakeholders including parents, 
 
3 Simon Baron-Cohen is, interestingly, the cousin of Sacha Baron Cohen. The two could 
not be more different; one creates deeply bigoted and distressingly popular media 
content that describes and normalises the worst excesses of society’s violence towards 
marginalized persons. The other wrote Borat. 
4 From whose book, Authoring autism, the title of this paper is lovingly purloined. 
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caregivers and more importantly health professionals”, but never self-
diagnosis (Thabtah, 2019); Irani et al.’s project adapted to feedback 
solicited from “the parents” (Irani et al., 2018); in Tariq et al.’s study, 
participation was determined by the parents—referred to throughout as 
the “participants”—despite the data covering autistic people up to the age 
of 17 (Tariq et al., 2018). Under the discourse of autism used, autistic 
people cannot consent or give feedback, not simply because they cannot 
communicate but because they have nothing to communicate. 
 
Knowledge, Agency and Personhood 
If autists are entities lacking in the ability to communicate and be social, 
and further, lacking the ability to have knowledge of self (much less 
knowledge of others): do autists have agency? Personhood? Are autists, 
really, human? 
 
I raise this question because the answer that dominant frames of autism 
provide is “no.” Indirect inhumanity is communicated through 
representations of autists as alien (Reddington & Price, 2016), 
robotic (Belek, 2017), or (in much of ethics, and in “autism advocacy”) 
analogous to psychopathy: an interesting thought experiment in whether 
one can be a moral agent while quite so neurologically deviant (McGeer, 
2008; Krahn & Fenton, 2009; Saunders, 2018). More directly, autism is 
treated as oppositional to the traits that “make” a person a person (Duffy & 
Dorner, 2011). Yergeau, while critiquing such ideas, summarises them 
with the statement that “humans are human because they possess a 
theory of mind, and autistics are inhuman because they do not” (Yergeau, 
2013). 
 
Portrayals of inhumanity in AIAD research and Daivergent’s materials are 
largely indirect. But one telling illustration of the wider industry context and 
approaches comes from media coverage of the company, discussing 
broader efforts to employ autistic people and other people with “intellectual 
disabilities” (IDD): 
 
“At Salesforce.com, a customer relationship management (CRM) software 
company headquartered in San Francisco, 46 IDD workers are currently core to 
the firm’s operations, says Benny Ebert-Zavos, manager of real estate 
communications for the organization. ‘We hire them to organize and maintain 
conference rooms, assist with event setup, support our reusable dish program, 
stock pantries, upkeep our social lounges, stock office supplies and brew coffee,’ 
he says. ‘These folks are the key to making sure that when people come in, they 
can focus on work.’” (Prafder, 2019) 
 
Notable is the distinction between “these folks” and people; the distinction 
between their labour and “work.” 
 
Similarly, we can see instances of how the treatment of autists as 
inhuman correspondingly portray autists as “divorced from concepts of 
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agency and autonomy” (Quirici, 2015). This is hardly surprising: 
Korsgaard, in reviewing the nature of agency, describes conventional 
conceptions of agency as consisting of the ideas “that the capacity for 
agency consists in or depends on the existence of certain normative 
relations, and that the realization of that capacity—success in action—
depends on conformity to the norms in question” (Korsgaard, 2014). In the 
case of autists, we can see the construction of autistic relating as 
abnormal, and of autists as incapable of adhering to normative relations, 
as precluding the possibility of autistic agency—at least, absent 
confirmation from normative actors. 
 
These ideas of autists as non-agentic feature heavily, albeit indirectly, in 
Daivergent’s literature—as a positive. Consider the rationales provided for 
hiring autistic people in particular; their dedication to engaging in the same 
tasks “month after month” (Kadet, 2019), a status that resonates more 
strongly with metaphors of machines than of people. But that is not all: 
companies should hire autistic people because they have “perseverance” 
and a “sense of loyalty;” because they are not going to leave (Levy, 2019). 
To be autistic, after all, is to neither know what you want nor how to 
communicate it, and so the concept of autonomous autists is as alien to a 
normative view of autism as autists allegedly are to themselves. 
 
Non-agentism and inhumanity also feature, albeit more implicitly, in much 
of the AIAD literature. As well as discussing communication, the literature 
also discusses violence and risk. An autistic person has “a very high risk 
for wandering; he can become very dangerous for himself, his family and 
the society as he can harm others as well as himself in an 
aggression” (Omar et al., 2019). Autism impacts “self-control and [the] 
person’s ability to learn” (Pahwa et al., 2016). Stimming and other 
“stereotypical motor movements can lead to self-injurious behaviour under 
certain environmental conditions” (Albinali et al., 2009). In all of these 
framings, autists appear as figures who are—as a consequence of this 
dearth of outer awareness and communication—fundamentally lacking; 
lacking control over self, lacking the ability to engage in inference, lacking, 
in other words, in agency and the ability to choose. An autist is not a 
person—an autist is a machine, one whose misfiring outputs betray faults 





In my analysis above, I examined the discursive framing of autistic 
communication and self that is deployed by Artificial Intelligence for 
Autism Diagnosis (AIAD) research, and the autist-employing startup 
“Daivergent.” In doing so I suggested that in both cases, work follows a 
normative approach in describing autists as lacking in communication, 
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sociality and sense of others—and further, lacking in sense of self. This 
approach results in turn in a perception of autists as unpersons; as 
inhuman, and as lacking in agency and autonomy. Below, I discuss the 
material and conceptual implications of AI research perpetuating and 
internalising this logic. 
 
The consequences of conventional frames 
Discourses are an important part of the “output” of sociotechnical systems 
and narratives—and a part inextricably wound up in how those discourses 
help shape the structure of society. Simply because something is 
discursive does not mean it does not have material consequences. So 
what are the implications of AI development perpetuating this conventional 
framing of autism? What consequences does this have for autistic people? 
Answering this requires us to take a step back and look at the existing 
consequences of these narratives. If we look at how autists are already 
treated in other sites, as a result of the conventional framing of autism, we 
see some profound and disturbing phenomena. Some of it is interactional, 
and day to day: the treatment of autistic sociality and communication as 
invalid and less-than creates heightened feelings of stigma and “negative 
difference and feeling lesser,” leading to the “exhausting” work of hiding 
one’s otherness, simulating normativity, for the fear of ostracisation should 
one be detected (Hodge et al., 2019). 
 
Other material consequences of conventional framings—and of their 
reinforcement—are far more tangible, and far more clearly violent. As a 
result of autistic communication being seen as an oxymoron, approaches 
to repairing communication failures between autists and non-autists are 
ones of normalisation: “fixing” autistic people, rather than attempting to 
meet autistic people in the middle. Such “repair” is frequently violent, 
featuring—in the case of Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA), the 
standard “treatment” for autists—training centered on “aversives:” 
responding to autists stimming, communicating non-normatively or “acting 
out” through withdrawing access to food, social interaction or touch. 
Children may be subject to aversives “in the forms of time-outs (often in 
closets, cells or segregated rooms), Tabasco sauce on one’s tongue, 
spray bottles filled with vinegar, forced proximity to a cold or hot surface, 
physical restraint, screams directed at the child, and so on”—all for 
something as simple as refusing to touch one’s nose (Yergeau, 2018, 
p.97). The most extreme form of this (or the logical conclusion of it, 
depending on one’s level of cynicism) can be seen in the form of the 
Judge Rothenberg Center, located in Massachusetts, which uses 
“aversives” such as straightjacketing, electrocution to the point of third-
degree burns, and the inhalation of ammonia (Adams & Erevelles, 2017). 
 
An immediate reaction to this is one of horror; what monstrosity! What 
inhumanity! But “inhumanity” is the point; of course these are the 
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therapies, of course the center has not been shut down: those subject to 
these tortures are not people. They cannot consent, in the sense that they 
cannot say “no;” what they say, even about the treatment of their own 
body, cannot be taken seriously at all. As Adams & Erevelles point out, it 
is not that (in the ensuing lawsuits) autistic people did not testify as to their 
experience and assaults—it is that their voices were not taken as 
communicating valid knowledge compared to the (professional, well-
adjusted, and credible) doctors (Adams & Erevelles, 2017). 
 
As this paper demonstrates, the attitude taken by Daivergent and AIAD 
researchers neatly fits into the conventional understanding of autism. 
Correspondingly, it reinforces them—in a small way, to be sure, but in a 
way that is still worthy of ethical and political notice. AI does not exist 
outside of the world, and so narratives within AI that further cement violent 
discourses have an impact on the broader domains—employment, and 
healthcare, in this case—in which autistic people are subject to this 
ongoing violence. 
 
More directly, one might ask what the construction of autism taken by 
these researchers and founders means for those directly interacting with 
them. What about AIAD patients, or Daivergent employees? If autists 
cannot validly know, whose perspective is foregrounded in the event that 
an autist disputes the outcome of a diagnostic algorithm? Whose 
perspective is foregrounded in the event that an autist disputes the 
morality of this algorithmic work in general? When autistic employment is 
oriented around assumptions of roboticism and machinic lack of self, what 
happens when autistic employees display autonomy? It is hard to imagine 
an AI company that sees autists as asocial or non-agentic as taking 
seriously, for example, attempts to unionise: a union of autists would be a 
contradiction in terms. 
 
The consequences of these framings are hardly evenly distributed; 
although race and gender are seldom, if ever, substantively raised in the 
sources (hence the lack of discussion in my findings), this is distinct from 
stating that the framings are not gendered and racialized. Mainstream 
conceptions of autism have always been both; as a few (but by no means 
exhaustive) set of examples, I would point to the way that Baron-Cohen’s 
“Theory of Mind” positions autism as constituting an “extreme male brain,” 
the broadening of autism diagnoses and criterion’s origins, in part, in a 
desire by white parents to differentiate their children from the 
(predominantly black) people diagnosed with “childhood schizophrenia” 
(Eyal et al., 2010), and the portrayal of Black autists as violent, and in 
need of controlling (Erevelles, 2014). So, too, is epistemic personhood 
gendered and racialized; there is a reason much of the work on 
knowledge and injustice originates in feminist and Black philosophy (Mills, 
2007; Ortega, 2006; Code, 2014). As a result, it would be unsurprising—
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indeed, it seems somewhat inevitable—to see the narratives of 
dehumanization I highlight, and their consequences, deployed particularly 
powerfully against gender and/or racial minorities. 
 
The consequences of conventional AI ethics 
Beyond the material consequences, however, these questions of 
autonomy, humanity and their discursive construction raise wider 
questions about the nature of AI ethics itself. They raise questions not 
simply about whether AI systems can be developed in a way that is just to 
autistic people, but whether AI ethics can reliably conceive of exclusionary 
injustices as a problem. 
 
Understanding what I mean by that requires that we take a step back. 
When I say “AI ethics” I mean something very particular; the normative, 
default set of values which (as discussed above) seem widely agreed 
upon as, if not an entire system for achieving justice, then at least a good 
starting point. Fairness, true, but also accountability and transparency. 
These principles are fundamentally premised on a recognition of injured 
parties as people, and as social creatures, and as viable knowers. 
Accountability requires being answerable to people and in conversation 
with them; transparency requires a relationship of shared exchange and 
reasoning; fairness requires a form of recognition and acknowledgement 
of a population as distinct and worthy of equality as “people.” In other 
words, AI practitioners are discursively framing certain populations as non-
human and non-agentic in parallel with ethical frameworks that depend on 
humanity and agency for addressing harms. 
 
In this case study we have seen how discourses of autists as asocial and 
non-agentic produce material harms—but it seems to me we should also 
ask what flaws they highlight in AI ethics frameworks for addressing those 
selfsame harms. If autistic people are being constructed by AI 
practitioners as incapable of agency and full humanity, in an ethical 
framework that treats agency and full humanity as mutual dependencies of 
each other, and both as a necessary prerequisite for participating in the 
frameworks to address injustices, then we have an impasse. If our 
approach to ethics is simultaneously (1) framed around notions of 
communication, credibility and recognition and (2) framing autistic people 
as lacking in those things, there is no viable way for autists to participate 
in processes that are frequently treated as the panacea to any injustice 
this domain generates. Autists will be subject to both discursive and 
material violence, and the discursive violence will strip us of the ability to 
viably dispute either. 
 
Now, one immediate solution to this might appear to be to move the 
goalposts—to declare that discursively framing autists as less-than-human 
is wrong. This would certainly help, although the issue is far more 
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widespread than one of discourses within AI ethics. Maintaining rigid 
boundaries around who counts as a person, and as a knower, is nearly 
ubiquitous in normative philosophy more generally. Liberal philosophy 
often treats people as “fully rational, mutually-independent 
decisionmakers” (Schwartzman, 2006); individuals who do not meet these 
conditions are denied access to decision-making processes and modes of 
political or ethical engagement. Such an approach is frequently criticised, 
for the same reasons that I raise concerns with AI ethics. In particular, 
feminist philosophers and philosophers of disability have taken issue with 
the way that the idea of rationality and independent agency as a basis for 
personhood risks silencing, harming and literally dehumanising those who 
(for whatever reason) cannot make a claim to such status. Moreover, 
because the resulting ethical frameworks assume such status, they are 
frequently “strangely silent about the predicaments of outsiders” (O’Neill, 
2000, p. 4)—as Lauren Davy notes in reviewing the work of John Rawls, 
disability is “relegated ... to a footnote ... a problem to be worked out later 
when all other matters of justice are settled” (Davy, 2019, p. 105). 
 
Critiques of these approaches, and the uneven distribution of what counts 
as rationality and interdependence, provide a set of ideas to ameliorate 
the harms that result—ideas that we may be able to use in AI ethics. The 
work of José Medina and Miranda Fricker, in particular, highlights the 
need for us to engage in work that includes not only openness and self-
criticality in how we interpret people and perspectives on an individual 
basis, but the construction of forms of “hermeneutical resistance:” ways of 
knowing and communicating that actively push back against monolithic 
ideas of personhood and knowledge (Medina, 2013; Medina, 2017; 
Fricker, 2007). In the case of AI ethics, this might look like actively pushing 
back against proposals for monolithic conceptions of justice, or 
mechanisms for achieving it, while developing more polyphonic and 
adaptive approaches. 
 
More broadly, we might consider different ways of conceptualizing 
personhood altogether. A feminist “care ethics” approach to personhood 
and knowledge that treats not just disabled people but all people as 
dependent on communities, infrastructure and relationships: that treats 
personhood as relational and wrapped up in our relationships of care to 
each other (Davy, 2019). To go further we might examine the 
“posthumanist ethics” of Karen Barad and others, which (as adroitly 
explained by Natasha Mauthner) “seeks to conceptualize ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical agency without recourse to the human 
subject” (Mauthner, 2019, pp. 680–681). Paying critical attention to how 
we conceptualise personhood and knowledge, and what we make those 
concepts depend on (and dependents of) would not simply allow for more 
disability-aware approaches to AI ethics, but additionally address 
concerns around race, gender and sexuality; Medina’s scholarship, 
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discussed above, is rooted in part in the recognition that knowledge—and 
humanity—are additionally (some would say, fundamentally) racialised 
and gendered. 
 
Still, I am cautious and cognizant that these suggestions are ultimately 
efforts to ameliorate dehumanization in the structure of mechanisms for 
correcting injustice. As demonstrated by the work of agonistic theorists in 
political philosophy, there is no singular approach that will “solve” the 
question of otherness and silencing (Honig, 2016; Mouffe, 2000). 
Regardless of where we draw the line with regards to personhood, 
knowledge and access to justice, we are drawing a line—marking some as 
legitimate and some as not. Pragmatically, my intention with this paper is 
to highlight a substantial loophole in conventional framings of AI ethics—
the loophole of personhood—and the need to address it. I do not believe 
we can escape silencing and perpetuating injustices altogether. But what 
we can do is confront it in how we theorise about justice, and mechanisms 
to achieve it. We can understand harm as an inescapable consequence of 
efforts to reduce it, and understand those efforts as ultimately contingent, 
and open to challenge. Most broadly, then, my demand is not simply for a 
consideration of discursive harm, and disabled voices, in the development 
of AI ethics, but a more wide-ranging demand that we avoid the fatal 





I have analysed the approach that both public and private-sector entities 
seeking to “help” autistic people with Artificial Intelligence take to defining 
and framing autism, and autists. Doing so has revealed that these entities, 
their research and their public materials push a vision of autists as asocial, 
unknowing and somewhat non-human creatures, lacking in agency and 
autonomy. 
 
This validates concerns that AI ethics is failing to attend to the 
consequences of AI discourses, and failing to attend to disability. But it 
also raises tensions and issues with the very premise of conventional AI 
ethics, which is often dependent on practices of communication and 
recognition, and so (tacitly) requires the treatment of individuals as 
“people” before their concerns can be heard. If autistic communication is 
invalid—if autists are invalid—and resolving harms is a communicative 
practice conducted between valid people, then harms to autistic people 
simply cannot be resolved under such a frame. 
 
One approach would be to make sure that we simply treat autistic people 
as people—but keeping a dependency on and bar to personhood still 
leaves some individuals dehumanised and unable to access our 
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frameworks for addressing harms, even if those individuals are not 
autistic. Instead, I advocate that critical attention be paid not only to the 
immediate barriers to accessing justice, but the status we give to 
“personhood” in the first place. This includes, as discussed, a greater 
attentiveness to the conditions under which we evaluate knowledge and 
communication, and efforts to reshape our idea of the ethical agent (and 
so victim of unethical behaviour) to be relational, rather than hyper-
individualised. I encourage researchers and practitioners concerned about 
disability justice specifically, or weaknesses in our ethical frameworks 
more generally, to consider these possibilities. 
 
My intention here is not to demand some particular universal ethic to 
replace the current one; I am unsure whether any universal approach can 
resolve these issues, rather than replicate them in new forms. Instead, my 
goal is simply to encourage an urgent recognition of how violence too-
often depends on our willingness to treat the terms of “humanity” and 
“personhood” uncritically, and accept them as a prerequisite for ethical 
attention. To this end, I want to underscore how vital it is that we retain 
and reinforce that critical lens—that we avoid treating any term of art or 
scheme of justice as unquestionable and “settled law.” Who can play the 
game is a vital question, but so, too, is whether the dice are loaded. 
Working towards justice requires us to continually ask the second, as well 
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